

## The paradoxical Trumpism, s behaviours

### Reality Check: Trump's Conventional Foreign Policy

#### Geopolitical Futures - George Friedman \_

Reply from: Mahmoud Saneipour



To: George Friedman

#### Subject:

#### The paradoxical Trumpism,s behaviours

من تشکر میکنم از آقای جورج فریدمن به خاطر مطالب ارزنده ای که پیرامون آقای ترا مپ ایراد کرده است ، من مایل هستم در مورد ترامپ از منظر رفتارشناسی ترامپیسم بحث کنم و این سبک گفتگو بر اساس هرمنوتیکی است که از طریق علم مفید آموختم که شامل علیت تراکمی ،جریان انطباقی و الهامات ماوراء الطبیعه است .

I thanked of Mr. George Freidman , because of Valuable content that he Is delivered around Mr. Trump , I would like to discuss about Trump From the perspective of **Trumpism,s behaviours** and this style conversation is basis on a Hermeneutics that I learned of usefulness science those includes of Cumulative Causality , Adaptive streaming , and Revelations paranormal .

ترامپ به ادبیات سیاست کشوردارای از منظر سیاست خارجی ومدیریت داخلی آشنائی ندارد ، آنچه او یافته است چانه زنی های تجارت مرسوم بوده که آدم دنیا پرست را ثروتمند می کند ودراین افزون طلبی ، از انجام هیچ عملی ، ترسی ندارد .

Trump is not familiar to literature of managerial affairs about country in view of external policies and internal management , what that he knows , it is bargaining of old trend trade that it makes rich any mnemonist, and like this

man doesn't afraid for doing any activity .

در حال حاضر ترامپ سه گرایش دنبال می کند ، رادیکالیستی ، کاپیتالیستی و ترامپیستی ، در مورد گرایش رادیکالیستی دارای زمینه های ذهنی و رفتاری جزمی بدوی گرایانه ، اخلاق غریزه ای ، صلب ، مجرد و جانب داری از وعده هائی است که آرمان هایش و یا رفقاییش داده است و از دنیا پرستی ، بهر نحوی پول درآوردن ، درزمره سرمایه داران دنیا بودن ، اشرافی زندگی کردن ، لژد بودن ، القاب داشتن و نظایر اینها ، بدیهی است که این عادات او را به مکتب خود ساخته سوق می دهد و از این ساخته خود ، الهامات فجور و تزاحم های بین المللی متصاعد میشود ، که من آنرا "ترامپیستی " می نامم .

Trump follows three tendencies at this present time, radicalism , capitalism and Trumpism , in regarding to radicalism , he has the mind and dogma Behaviour backgrounds , instinctive moral , hard, single, and in the direction to self- promises or his friends and related to mnemonist , making money in any way , rich man is , living so much aristocratic manner , be Lord of , having many titles and so on, Obviously, these Idioms lead him to self – made school And from this virtual fireplace , will rise paranormal oppression and international troubles that I named it **“The paradoxical Trumpism,s behaviours “**

بنابراین آمریکا با یک رهبری مثلث گونه و پیچیده روبرو است ، درحالیکه در جهان امروز وبا پیچیدگی های ذاتی خودش که در تغییرات شدیدی از ماهیت بازار ،تنوع سیاستگذاری ها ، بحران اقتصادها ، تداخل فرهنگ ، علم و فناوری روبرو است به مدل ها و راه حل های نوینی نیاز دارد که بتواند ، چالش های موجود را حل کند و آمریکا بیک دانشمند ، میان رشته ای و با تجربه نیاز دارد که بالغ بر 100 مسئله کشور در ابعاد داخلی و خارجی حل کند ، حالا چگونه می توان با حاصل ضرب این دو پیچیدگی ، آمریکا را اداره کرد ، وضعیت خطرناک است !

Therefore, America faces to Any triangle and Complexity leadership , while in todays , the world faces to self- entity complexes in transmuted market , diversities policies making , economies crisis , inter- cultures , S&T and so on , and it is necessary to new models and new solutions about these matters , then America needs to a political scientist, and prudential interdisciplinary expert till he can solve 100 internal and external problems in America , now , how can about solved this situation by force two the mentioned contortions , the situation is very dangerous.

مردم آمریکا در این برهه از زمان که هنوز تخریب زیاده شده است باید با رهیافت های قانون اساسی

آمریکا و اختیارات مجلس سنا اقدام جدی کنندوکسی را بر گزینند که دوستی ها و کامله الودادی امریکا با کشورهای جهان توسعه داده و از توسعه روابط تجاری و همگرایی های بین المللی و سایر تدابیر شایسته که متضمن منافع همه ملت ها و دول باشد ، اقدام نمایند در غیر اینصورت ، امریکا آینده نیکی ندارد.

The people of America should be take necessary action by the way of solving America's constitutional law and authorities of senate parliament from probably more destroys in future and they select one who can develop peace, friendship and most-favored between America and other countries for developing relation trade and international convergences and other merit managing in relation whit nations and governments, except this natural position, America hasn't a good future.

**Feb. 9, 2017**

By George Friedman

### **Trump's Conventional Foreign Policy**

**All the uproar in recent weeks has had little to do with foreign policy.**

Things have not been dull since [President Donald Trump](#) took office almost three weeks ago, but something that has been little noticed is the increasing traditionalism of some parts of his foreign policy. Certainly, his order to [suspend visas for citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries](#) was explosive, but in point of fact, whether people from Yemen can come to the United States is not a central issue in U.S. foreign policy.

What is central is [the future of U.S. relations with NATO](#). Before the election, Trump gave clear indications that he was unhappy with NATO's structure, performance and relevance to American strategic needs. On Feb. 7, Trump declared his commitment to NATO without any mention of alternatives.

**Ethnic Yemenis and supporters protest against President Donald Trump's executive order temporarily banning immigrants and refugees from seven Muslim-majority countries, including Yemen, on Feb. 2, 2017 in the**

## **Brooklyn borough of New York City. Spencer Platt/Getty Images**

Similarly, during the election, Trump suggested a massive [revision of relations with Russia](#), arguing that he would welcome warmer ties. His position now is that the sanctions on Russia should remain in place, and he has given no indication that the reconciliation he spoke of during the election is going to happen. He spoke to and expressed his support for the Ukrainian president, something not designed to please the Russians.

[China was going to be Trump's first target](#). Thus far, little has happened but rhetoric, and even that has died down. There have been some recent exchanges over the South and East China seas. But such rhetoric was common during former President Barack Obama's administration and [represents continuity more than a radical shift](#).

Granted, we are only three weeks into his administration, but three weeks under Trump is not like that of other administrations. Trump moves by a different clock than the others. And the fact is he has moved. But his movement here has tended to shift away from discontinuity to, at least thus far, maintenance of the status quo. Even on Iran, which fired a ballistic missile to test him, his response has been relatively mild, consisting of some sanctions and a review of U.S.-Iranian relations. In most administrations, a review of relations tended to mean that the U.S. was highly annoyed and would think of things to do about it, but would not actually do them.

There is, therefore, a deepening question about Trump's foreign policy – if anything can be said to be deepening after three weeks. The question is whether it is actually his intention to downgrade NATO, shift relations with Russia, confront China and take significant action against Iran. Certainly, the president chose to be hostile to Australia in a conversation with the Australian prime minister, but it is hard to see any policy shift. Hostile phone calls and threatening tweets do not a foreign policy make, so the strange call to the Australian prime minister probably doesn't indicate policy change.

There are three possible explanations for what is going on. One is that most of the foreign policy talk was campaign rhetoric. Much of what Obama or former President George W. Bush said they would do never actually happened. Perhaps

Trump is the same. He made campaign promises that he may or may not intend to keep, but reality and political events make them impossible.

A second explanation is that his senior national security staff – Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, [Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis](#) and [National Security Adviser Michael Flynn](#) – are shaping the foreign policy. To put it bluntly, the president, like other presidents, knows that his re-election and popularity depend on domestic politics (and immigration is a domestic issue in this context). Therefore, he will focus his time and political capital on politically important issues, letting foreign policy be handled at the secondary level. If that's the case, Mattis and Tillerson will approach these issues with a tempo and sequence that is more conventional than Trump's. That does not mean that they will not shift U.S. policy. It just means that it will take much longer.

A third explanation could be that Trump has recognized the complexity of these issues and the possible consequences of miscalculation. In the same way that Obama did not spend political capital on his promise to close Guantanamo or pull all troops out of Iraq or Afghanistan, so too Trump may have realized that some of the things he promised to do cannot be done. Others can, but only with meticulous care and thought.

I do not know the president or the dynamic between the key members of his foreign policy team, and therefore, I cannot tell whether this is a change between campaign rhetoric and presidential decision-making or just a delay of a few weeks. What I can say is that these were some of the issues on which he was most assertive during the campaign, and thus far, he has not made them a priority. Things like [ordering a new strategy for fighting the Islamic State](#) is not a change of policy. Obama was committed to that. It may be a change of strategy, but if it is, Mattis' program to rebuild the military will have to be put in place before this strategy starts yielding results.

We are all looking for hints of Trump's intention on many things. I don't know what this portends for the future, but for the moment, his approach has been interestingly conventional. All the uproar has had little to do with the fundamentals of foreign policy.

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### **By George Friedman**

Donald Trump has been elected president of the United States. The extent of the bewilderment is significant. The pollsters were shocked. The media was surprised. The financial markets were stunned. Many in the Republican Party were astonished. And the Democratic Party was totally taken off guard. The thought that a man with Trump's values and behavior could become president was, to many, unthinkable. I do not mean that they disagreed with him, or hoped that Trump would lose. They thought it inconceivable that a man like Trump could win.

Republican President-elect Donald Trump delivers his acceptance speech during his election night event at the New York Hilton Midtown in the early morning hours of Nov. 9, 2016 in New York City. Donald Trump defeated Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton to become the 45th president of the United States. Mark Wilson/Getty Images

That is the reason Hillary Clinton lost. [The Democratic Party that nominated her has moved far away from the party that Franklin D. Roosevelt crafted or that Lyndon B. Johnson had led](#). Their party had as its core the white working class. The liberalism of FDR and LBJ was built around this group, with other elements added and subtracted. Much has been said about this group having become less important. Perhaps so, but it is still the single largest ethnic and social group in the country.

This group, as I have argued before, is in trouble. The middle class, with a median take-home pay in California of about \$4,300 a month, can buy a modest house and a car but certainly can't afford to send their kids to college. Hence the massive student loans their children must take out. The lower-middle class has a take-home

pay of about \$2,600 a month. A generation ago the lower-middle class could buy a small house in a not-so-great neighborhood. Now they are hard pressed to rent an apartment. Liberals are concerned with inequality. People in the lower-middle class are simply concerned with making enough money to live a decent life. They are two very different things.

[Trump, it turns out, understood this problem.](#) He also understood that these people had lost the culture wars that had been waged for the past generation. Their churches and parents raised and taught them that homosexuality is a sin, as is abortion and premarital sex. Evangelical Christianity wasn't so much the issue, but rather the gut values with which they were raised. Many of this class had sinned, but they knew it was a sin and they valued the standards they'd been taught, even when they didn't live up to them.

Within a generation, this lower- and middle-class group had been displaced. Pride that comes from working hard and making a good living for their families was lost. They found that values they had regarded as commonplace were now regarded as phobias, illnesses they must overcome in order to be politically correct. Values they were taught as children could no longer be expressed in public.

This middle-class group no longer had a place in the Democratic Party. They felt the Democratic Party not only had contempt for them, but also that it valued immigrants and the rights and culture of immigrants, far more than it valued the beliefs of the white middle class. That was true, but it was not the immigrants the party valued, it was the upper-middle class, college-educated victors in the culture wars.

When Clinton made her extraordinary speech about Trump's basket of "deplorable," she was expressing the chasm of contempt that had opened up within the Democratic Party between the educated and the working class. She said there were two baskets. In one was the homophobic, xenophobic misogynists. In the other basket were the poor who had been left behind. It was not clear that this second basket was deplorable, but those in it were certainly not her major concern. Clinton made the "deplorable" statement to make it clear that not only was Trump unacceptable, but his followers were too. Clearly, she didn't think she needed their

votes. But she did need to reinforce her base's sense of fighting the good fight against evil and failure.

What Clinton and the elite didn't understand was that this group was sufficient to serve as Trump's base and that he could add to it. Looking at exit polls, the hostility of women to Trump turned out to not be there. Over 20 percent of Hispanics voted for Trump. Trump built a coalition that Clinton believed could not be built. It was in some ways a broader coalition than she had created. The elite made assumptions about women, Hispanics and others implying it was inconceivable for anyone other than the deplorable to support Trump.

Clinton's statement about Trump's followers struck me at the time, and still does, as amazing. She was then a few points ahead of Trump, which meant that nearly half of the country supported him. By implication, she was saying that half the country is deplorable. Her statement was not only contemptuous, but showed her to be a terrible politician. To win the election, she needed to hold all of her supporters, plus take away some of Trump's. The deplorable statement drove many off instead.

It was not only bad politics. It also represents a core internal problem. The elite of the United States – and all countries have and need elites – has become profoundly self-enclosed. This is similar to the situation in the U.K. when the elite was enraged at the Brexit referendum result, and hurled epithets at the narrow majority that voted for Brexit, calling them uneducated, incapable of understanding the issues and so on.

Economic stresses build up in all societies at various points. At this moment, European countries are undergoing the same sort of stresses as the United States, but even more intensely. Nationalist movements are growing in many of those countries. They are hostile to the European Union, oppose uncontrolled immigration and are resentful of policies that impose austerity that affects the middle and lower classes, without significant impact on the elite.

Trump is part of this broader crisis. Where European nationalists oppose the EU, Trump wants to renegotiate NAFTA. Where the Europeans oppose uncontrolled Muslim immigration, Trump opposes Muslim and Mexican immigration. Where



the Europeans talk about ending austerity, Trump speaks of tax cuts to stimulate investment.

Whether these policies are appropriate is not what matters here. The issue is that extended economic dysfunction has inevitable political consequences. This presidential campaign pivoted on the fact that Clinton did not understand the political movement that was rising and dismissed it as marginal. Trump did understand it, played to it and won the presidency. But it goes one step deeper. He won the election by arguing that Washington and the media were oblivious to the economic problem. During the later days of the campaign, he consistently made the claim that the Washington elite in particular was completely out of touch with the reality of any Americans outside its class.

I can safely assert Trump was the better politician. He won, not an overwhelming victory, but a decisive one. Clinton's weakness was that she saw her position at the heart of the political establishment as decisive. She dismissed Bernie Sanders in spite of his strength, and she never really took Trump seriously. She regarded the 3-point lead in the polls as sufficient. That was complacency, but it hid a lack of understanding that a political volcano was building in the middle class, and many others shared in the sense that things were going wrong.

Clinton didn't see a major problem, although her predecessors in the Democratic Party (LBJ and FDR) had. Her advisers didn't see it. Instead they saw an intemperate man hurling insults at others, totally unsuited for high office. Unfortunately, voters turned out to be far less interested in Trump's rudeness than in Clinton's cluelessness.

Some will lay blame for the loss on FBI Director James Comey's letter. That undoubtedly contributed to it. But it was not decisive. Economic dysfunction leads to political upheaval, and Clinton didn't grasp the significance of the dysfunction. And somewhere in her mind the fact that white males without a college degree opposed her indicated that only deplorable people opposed her, although why white males without a college education should be thought of as deplorable is an important question.

In any case, the election is a surprise only because the polls were so wrong. Trump was likely in the lead for quite a while. The decline in the accuracy of polls is

noteworthy, primarily because Clinton might have thought more deeply about her situation if she had known she was behind.

Trump executed an obnoxious campaign. I was deeply offended by his attack on John McCain, not over the question of whether McCain was a hero, but rather because Trump said he preferred pilots who don't get shot down to those who do. As commander in chief, he will, like every president since FDR, have to order troops into harm's way. How does a commander order his pilots to strike, when they know that if they are shot down, their commander's respect for them will decline? This was an election where offensive statements abounded. Trump had more than Clinton, but Clinton's comments were a direct attack on a class of voters, which was more startling. In the end, the voters decided.

Trump will be president and he has made sweeping promises as all candidates do. It is easy to dismiss these promises, as it was easy to dismiss the idea that he would get the Republican nomination, or that he would win the election. Like all political leaders he will be constrained by reality. But seeing reality clearly enough to achieve what others think is impossible is what makes great leaders. I have difficulty imagining what his government will look like, but I was someone who thought he would never get the Republican nomination. It is important to be cautious about dismissing this man.

George Friedman

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

*Not to be confused with the French sociologist, [Georges Friedmann](#).*



**George Friedman.**

**George Friedman** (born February 1, 1949) is a geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs. He is the founder and chairman of **Geopolitical Futures**, a new online publication that analyzes and forecasts the course of global events.<sup>[1]</sup> Prior to founding Geopolitical Futures, Friedman was chairman of [Stratfor](#), the private intelligence publishing and consulting firm he founded in 1996. Friedman resigned from Stratfor in May 2015.<sup>[2]</sup>

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Biography[[edit](#)]

Prior to joining the private sector, Friedman regularly briefed senior commanders in the armed services as well as the Office of Net Assessments, [SHAPE](#) Technical Center, the [U.S. Army War College](#), National Defense University and the [RAND Corporation](#), on security and national defense matters.<sup>[3]</sup>

Friedman pursued [political philosophy](#) with his early work focusing on [Marxism](#), as well as [international](#) conflict, including examination of the [U.S.-Soviet relationship](#) from a military perspective. After the [collapse of the Soviet Union](#), he studied potential for a U.S.-Japan conflict and co-authored *The Coming War with Japan* in 1991.

Friedman is a New York Times bestselling author via his most popular book, *The Next 100 Years* (2009). His 2015 book *Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe*, forecasts the turmoil currently being seen in Europe stemming from economic, immigration and political issues. Other of Friedman's books include *The Next Decade*, *America's Secret War*, *The Future of War* and *The Intelligence Edge*. His books have been translated into over 20 languages.

Friedman is also a keynote speaker at conferences, corporate and industry-specific events.<sup>[4]</sup>

In 1996, he founded [Stratfor](#), a private intelligence and forecasting company, and served as the company's CEO and Chief Intelligence Officer. Stratfor's head office is in [Austin, Texas](#). He retired from Stratfor in May 2015.

In 2015, he founded Geopolitical Futures, a subscription-based forecasting service which provides regular updates to regional geopolitical forecasts.<sup>[5]</sup> Within Geopolitical Futures, Friedman produces the weekly feature, Geopolitical Pulse.<sup>[6]</sup>

Personal life[[edit](#)]

Friedman was born in [Budapest, Hungary](#) to Jewish parents who survived the [Holocaust](#). His family fled Hungary when he was a child to escape the Communist regime, settling first in a camp for displaced persons in Austria and then immigrating to the [United States](#), where he attended public schools in [New York City](#), and was an early designer of computerized war games. Friedman describes his family's story as "a very classic story of refugees making a new life in America." He received a B.A. at the [City College of New York](#), where he majored in political science, and a [Ph.D.](#) in [government](#) at [Cornell University](#).<sup>[7]</sup>

Friedman is married to Meredith Friedman (née LeBard), has four children, and lives in [Austin, Texas](#). She served as Vice president of Stratfor for international relations and communication, before helping to launch Geopolitical Futures.<sup>[8]</sup> She also coauthored several publications, for example *The Coming War with Japan*.<sup>[9]</sup>

Books[[edit](#)]

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8. [Jump up^ Details'](#) about Meredith Friedman und Stratfor, based on former information about executives on Stratfor's homepage which meanwhile has been deleted.
9. [Jump up^ Booknotes](#) interview with Friedman and Meredith LeBard on *The Coming War with Japan*, June 9, 1991.

External links [[edit](#)]

- [George Friedman in the news.](#)
- [Bio of Friedman](#) at *America's Secret War's* website.
- [Bio of Friedman](#) at New Global Initiative's website.
- [Appearances](#) on [C-SPAN](#)
  - [Booknotes interview with Friedman and Meredith LeBard on \*The Coming War With Japan\*, June 9, 1991.](#)