

In the name of Allah

اروپا بدون آمریکا شایسته تر میشود

Being competenceability of union Europe become better without America

نویسنده و مفسر جریان های سیاسی جهان: محمود صانعی پور

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مفروضات:

Supposed:

1. تروریست توسط اسرائیل ، امریکا و آل سعود تولید شده و اکنون مزاحم اروپا است [1]
2. Terrorist created by Israel, America and Saudi Arabia and now it is intervene in Europe [2] .
3. روسیه با اروپا دشمنی ندارد ، رهبری جهانی امریکا را قبول ندارد و جهان چند قطبی شده است [3]
4. Russia has not enmity whit Europe, it has not accept America's leadership in the world and now has been created polycentric situations. [4]
5. برچیدن ناتو برای اروپا خطری ندارد [5].
6. removing NATO is not a threat to Europe [6]
7. امروز اروپا به فرضیه جدیدی برای یک اتحادیه قدرتمند نیاز دارد [7] .
8. Today, Europe needs a new hypothesis for a powerful Union [8]
9. اروپا دارای فلسفه زیبا زیستن است ، و فرهنگ قوی برای جذب ادبیات نوین دارد [9].
10. Europe has a philosophy of life is beautiful and has a powerful culture for new literature. [10]
11. ترامپ با هر عربده ، اروپا ، ایران و آسیا را عزیز تر کرده است [11]
12. Trump with drunken brawl, Europe, Iran and Asia has more dear
13. چرا اروپا از آمریکا واهمه دارد ، آمریکا کرک و پشمش ریخته است و در حال فروپاشی است [13]

14. Why Europe is afraid of America, America has spilled its fluff and wool, and Falling apart[14]

15. اروپا باید به آسیا بیشتر نزدیک شود[15]

16. Europe should be closer to Asia [16]

Merit Europe, America realized(Europe without America)

1. **NATO** without America
2. Donald Trump is wrecking U.S. alliance with Europe
3. American Withdrawal Presents Opportunity for Europe
4. Europe Must Plan to Defend Itself
5. Europe is in crisis. Once more, America will have to step in to save us
6. Europe without America
- 7.

EUROPE IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

NATO without America

Like democracy, our European allies are our worst option except for all the others. The Europeans need us, and we need them—let's not call the whole thing off.

Impalpable sigh of relief emanated from NATO's headquarters in Brussels and the capitals of 27 NATO members when Donald Trump finally had a good word to say about history's most successful and enduring alliance. He did not, of course, go so far as to acknowledge NATO's genuine achievements: agreeing in 1949 that an attack on any allied state would be considered an attack on all; creating in 1950 a structure of military commands that facilitates operations and creates a common strategic culture among members' militaries; integrating West Germany as a military power into a cooperative framework in 1954; holding at bay bristling Soviet aggression for 45 years and Russian revanchism since; voluntarily sharing the burdens of a common defense—including nuclear weapons responsibilities; using America as a counterweight to potentially ruinous intra-European competition; reunifying Germany in 1991 without setting off alarms among European countries and Russia; imposing an end to the Balkan wars in 1995 and keeping the still-hostile parties from shooting at each other since; expanding the perimeter of security that encourages prosperity and accountable governance to Eastern and Southern Europe; preventing the Qaddafi regime from carrying out its apparent plan

to massacre Libyans in March 2011; fighting for 15 years in Afghanistan; and continually finding ways to adapt a Cold War institution to new security challenges.

But at least President Trump finally acknowledged that NATO is not obsolete, and has important counter-terrorism work underway. While meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on April 12 the President ludicrously took credit for those developments, claiming they were in response to his leadership. Secretary General Stoltenberg, a model of diplomatic restraint, allowed the fiction to stand in order to pocket the progress. It was a welcome change from what the truculent American President had recently told the *Financial Times*: “Alliances have not always worked out very well for us. But I do believe in alliances.” U.S. allies are now beginning to hope that the scorn with which President Trump looks upon their contributions is attenuating.

President Trump is certainly ruder than previous American leaders have been in decrying the shortfalls of our European allies, but the aggravation has long been widespread and is still growing. Americans of all political stripes believe it is long past time for Europe to stop indulging in post-Cold War defense cuts. Every American President of the past thirty years—actually longer, for the plaint goes back to the early years of the Nixon Administration—has dreamt up a NATO initiative to cajole greater defense expenditures out of our European allies. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s dire warning in 2011 that American patience was wearing thin went largely unheeded; the European reaction to Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson’s messages that the time has come to meet the 2 percent spending obligation has been “How dare *they*?” not “How dare *we*?” As this round of dispute rumbles forward, it is sure to seize on the fact that the obligation undertaken at the 2014 Wales NATO summit is only to “aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.” There is technically no obligation to actually meet the requirement by 2024.

Why, then, does the United States expend so much time and effort on its European allies?

The Free-Rider Problem

The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance will meet in Brussels on May 25, hoping to continue the education of a President seemingly impervious to its importance. Rightly skeptical that President Trump would sit still for speeches by other heads of government (even President Obama would read on his iPad or leave the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in the American place at the table and slink out), and fearful that he will further undercut Europe’s security by ventilating his ambivalence about the organization, the North

Atlantic Council is considering taking the real-estate developer on a tour of its new headquarters instead.

This is likely to be a disaster. Coming in overtime and over budget, the headquarters cost \$1.3 billion, 22 percent of which was paid for by the United States, a proportion ostensibly based on the distribution of allied wealth but that has remained roughly the same since 1952.¹ Even UN dues have been adjusted to reflect reality since then. The building is likelier to become an example of European profligacy with which the President regales his crowds. One can see the tweet taking shape: “Bloated Europe wastes billions on bad real estate deal! Won’t spend on military! Bring our troops home!”

During his campaign, Donald Trump fulsomely criticized America’s NATO allies for fleecing us, expecting the United States to provide for their security while they manipulate their currencies and set trade rules detrimental to America’s prosperity. Candidate Trump routinely argued that NATO was a Cold War relic, needlessly provoking Russia by expanding its membership and neglectful of the true problem of terrorism. President Trump continued the fusillade, relentlessly reiterating that NATO allies are failing to meet their obligation to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. The day after meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he tweeted that Germany “owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!”

Most of NATO’s American advocates (me included) have responded by reiterating time-honored, misty-eyed encomia about Transatlantic solidarity, emphasizing that the only time NATO’s mutual defense clause was invoked was by European and Canadian governments in solidarity with us after the September 11 attacks. Those arguments have fallen on deaf ears, because, as with many of the President’s outlandish claims, there is a kernel of truth to his excoriation. NATO allies *do* rely too heavily on American military power when it is well within their ability to provide for themselves. NATO allies *should* meet the obligation freely undertaken at the 2014 summit to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Touching as the show of solidarity after September 11 was, Canada was the only ally whose military cooperation was essential, and that cooperation is provided bilaterally through the North American Aerospace Defense agreements. Civilian air traffic control would surely have been provided without NATO fighter and AWACs planes patrolling American skies; intelligence-sharing is mostly done bilaterally or through the Five Eyes consortium.

And lest we get too sentimental about NATO, recall that the 2001 NATO invocation was the deft handiwork of the British government, part of a broader campaign to show an American administration they feared would act both recklessly and unilaterally the value of institutionalized multilateral cooperation (and Britain's essential role in securing it). NATO Secretary General George Robertson diplomatically avoided questions about whether the Bush Administration had asked for the invocation of Article 5, brilliantly coercing recalcitrant allies with ominous warnings of an America unconcerned with Europe.

But even if the support of some allies was grudging, they did nonetheless pledge on September 12 that the attack on us was an attack on them, and offer any and all support the Bush Administration wanted in the unnerving aftermath. That Americans were consumed with doing as quickly as possible all that was needed in those unimagined circumstances in no way diminishes the magnitude of commitment evinced by our allies.

Robertson's refrain that NATO is America's "permanent coalition of choice" rang less true during the 2003 Iraq War. Some allies shared American motivations—Tony Blair famously countered a journalist's charge that Britain simperingly bowed to the Bush Administration's arguments by saying "it's even worse than you fear: I actually believe them." Some allies new to NATO were startled to find themselves pressed for political support and forces for a fight far afield of their own security. Some allies saw opportunities to advance an anti-American agenda in the Middle East and beyond (France's condemnation of the war at a UN meeting on terrorism and French President Jacques Chirac's flirtation with a Francophone bloc as a counterweight to NATO especially stung). Some allies, Germany especially, feared what America was becoming. That we proceeded despite their objections cast a long shadow over alliance relations.

Stessa Spiaggia, Stesso Mare²

Still, the Iraq War cast no longer a shadow than the Vietnam War, which it paralleled in many ways. It cast no longer a shadow than the Mansfield Amendments of the early 1970s, which would have required the removal of U.S. troops from Europe unless NATO allies dramatically increased their defense spending. It cast no longer a shadow than the acrimonious departure of France from NATO's military command in 1965, or the U.S. refusal to support Britain and France during their military intervention in Egypt in October 1956. It cast no longer a shadow than the dispute over German rearmament in 1954, which saw the most ardently Europeanist President, Dwight Eisenhower, threaten NATO allies with "an agonizing reappraisal" of the American commitment to NATO.

Indeed, the history of the NATO alliance is one of frequent mutual disappointment. It is also a history of governments realizing they have no better option than to continue wrangling each other into persevering. Fundamentally, Europe cannot be confident in its safety without American assurances. This is less a matter of raw military power and economic prowess than of diplomatic culture. Britain (perhaps decreasingly) and France retain the reflexes of great powers and do not blanch at the use of military force to achieve their political aims—French operations in Mali have proved a salutary model for the limited use of force in support of foreign governments. The forces of Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands made a good showing in Libya. The Baltic states have upped their game considerably in response to Russian threats both novel (hybrid and cyber warfare) and traditional (intimidation with large-scale military exercises).

But most European governments conduct their national security policies at a much greater distance from their militaries, celebrating their concentration on “soft power” tools in lieu of force. Not only do they privilege those tools, they often consider their policies, and themselves, morally superior for the choice. One need only listen to EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker or read of the European Parliament passing legislation condemning U.S. intelligence agencies to share President Trump’s aggravation with Europe. We sentimentalize the Transatlantic connection at our peril.

However, NATO’s fundamental bargain continues to be overwhelmingly advantageous to the United States. European states would be both less willing and less able to help us without NATO. European allies would likely spend even less—not more—on defense without the constant hectoring of the United States within NATO. They would likely spend more on military pay and benefits than on high-end weapons and capabilities; all Western militaries must contend with competing demands on their funding, but the problem is more effectively addressed in NATO, where militaries have greater political capital to make hard choices than in solely national or EU forums. They would not be nearly as able to get organized and act decisively for a common purpose when needed. And they would be less likely to feel an obligation to participate in wars that the U.S. military fights beyond Europe. Diplomatically, we would need to negotiate European states *into* participating in our endeavors rather than expecting them to proffer a good excuse to remain out. That may seem a subtle difference, but it isn’t.

The truth is that the United States would willingly trade the Europeans in for better allies, if only better allies could be found. Australia, yes—a government serious about its security, with a capable, reasonably well-financed, and innovative military, a culturally

comfortable political system, and a history of cooperation. But it, too, spends just barely 2 percent of GDP on defense.

Japan pays more in support of American bases and stationed troops than do our European allies, but that checkbook diplomacy must be weighed against its inhibitions about spending more than 1 percent of GDP on its own defense, deploying fighting forces in support of allied operations even in Asia (their defense law has been interpreted to obviate even support of U.S. efforts to defend South Korea), and cooperating militarily with its neighbors. Under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's leadership a decade ago, Japan made a fundamental realignment, slowly and gently building domestic support for greater defense spending and cooperation, refueling U.S. ships *en route* to Afghanistan, and sending troops for humanitarian tasks in Iraq (the first international deployment of Japanese troops since 1945). Subsequent Japanese governments have creatively built security linkages, exported defense equipment, and conducted joint military patrols with the forces of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. But as useful as it has become, Japan cannot provide a substitute for the direct participation of European allies.

South Korea also has a robust defense budget and a very capable military that has contributed to the wars of the past 15 years, but it remains skittish about cooperating with Japan and is understandably focused on the challenges of the Korean Peninsula (including its own domestic political crises). Rounding out the list of the world's ten top defense spenders are our adversaries China and Russia; India, which is slowly shifting toward cooperation with the United States because of China's worrying behavior; Saudi Arabia, Britain, France, and Germany.

The Saudis are often maligned as being as great a threat as al-Qaeda or ISIS. This not only ignores the great changes in Saudi national security policy, especially after the 2005 terrorist attack in Riyadh, but also the important political and social changes enacted under the influence of the Emirates' successes and a reformist leadership in the Kingdom. America's partners in the region have gone on a defense-spending spree, driven by concern about Iranian efforts to destabilize Sunni governments and infiltrate Shi'an ones. Even with those changes, however, impediments to deeper cooperation remain—Hillary Clinton's trial balloon as Secretary of State about extending nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia deflated quickly due to the American public's hesitant attitudes toward a country so politically and culturally different.

The possibility certainly exists of strengthening relationships with the countries of the Middle East. Jordan, in particular, has been heroic in its generosity to Syrian refugees and

courageous in its policies toward the Assad government. The United Arab Emirates leads in the development of serious military forces and in cooperating with U.S. operations, as it did in Libya. Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE have been stalwart in their commitment to the war in Afghanistan and are being cajoled into a common front against ISIS. Even so, the countries of the Middle East pose challenges that European allies do not. With regard to Egypt and Turkey in particular, the Trump Administration seems to have averted its eyes from the domestic governance concerns that have inhibited previous administrations and tend to sow the seeds of future internal violence. And these countries contribute vastly less to a range of common defense efforts—anti-piracy to take but one example—than do Europeans.

Most of America's capable regional allies around the world have significant limitations in extending operations beyond their immediate regions. Furthermore, their spending levels overall fail to impress. If we rank countries by per capita military spending, Saudi Arabia far outstrips all other states at \$6,909; the United States ranks only 4th with \$1,859 per person (Singapore and Israel both spend more). Rounding out the top 15 per-person spenders on defense, though, are seven more NATO allies (Norway, Greece, Britain, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands). When as NATO allies' spending often seems, it still stacks up favorably against other countries', and NATO allies are unusual in their willingness to engage beyond their region in support of U.S. efforts.

The Logic of Collective Action

It also merits emphasizing that NATO and "Europe" are not the same. Very often when American exasperation boils up at Europeans, it is the European Union we are reacting to. Not only do the EU's ambitions outpace its achievements, its advocates and officials often seek acclaim in the present for intentions to accomplish things in the future. But while most NATO allies are also in the European Union, they behave differently in each setting because the institutional cultures of the two organizations are markedly different.

American leadership in NATO creates opportunities that we will never have in other venues. The integrated military command (IMC) in NATO is the way we go to war, because the NATO allies are the countries we most frequently fight alongside, and the long-practiced procedures of the IMC facilitate understanding. Allies show up using equipment compatible with American equipment, talk on radio frequencies already known to American forces, share intelligence across linked systems, and drop bombs that can be shared if one country's forces run short.

General Tommy Franks is said to have complained in the run-up to the Afghanistan war that he didn't have time to become an expert on the Danish Air Force. That may be as much an admission of his limitations as a reflection of the contribution of the Danish Air Force, because the United States already has an expert on the Danish Air Force: NATO's senior military commander. The Supreme Allied Commander for Operations (formerly Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) has always been an American. Europeans insist on that, not only because they want a strong transatlantic connection, but also because very few European commanders have run operations of the breadth and complexity that American commanders routinely do.

General Franks's complaint is also characteristic of a time when the American military and even some high-level officials in the Bush Administration arrogantly believed that allies were more hindrance than help—a time of technological dominance and short wars that showcased America's advantages and investments. Appreciation of allied contributions has increased in proportion to the duration and grimness of the wars we continue to fight. The CENTCOM commander would gladly become an expert on the Danish Air Force now in order to have a supply of allied forces to fight alongside our own.

The U.S. military makes two other complaints about NATO: that member states constrain the use of their forces, and that the pace of collective innovation is slow. Caveats, as they are called in NATO, are the limits that governments place on the participation of their militaries. These typically take the form of more restrictive rules of engagement, such as allowing the air forces only to conduct surveillance and refueling but not drop bombs. In a few extreme instances these restrictions may result in a refusal of a mission or order, as when British General Mike Jackson refused U.S. General Wesley Clark's direction to prevent Russian troops from taking the Pristina airfield during the Kosovo War.

Frustrating as caveats are, they are legitimate expressions of the political constraints under which governments operate. Which mission's a force should engage in, and how great the public tolerance is for casualties suffered in these operations, are constant and valid questions for all elected leaders. Americans often lack perspective about this problem since we ultimately command the forces; if we were placing our troops under foreign command, you can bet Congress would be baying and the administration of the day would be carefully litigating tight restrictions.

The challenge in every multinational operation is how to marry willingness and ability with needed tasks—and NATO is better at that matchmaking than any other American

outfit, because of long practice. Allies have fewer regrets about their participation in NATO operations than about pairing with other American combatant commands (for example, there was a rash of complaints from allies about their treatment by CENTCOM early on in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars).

Synchronizing innovation is the hardest military problem to manage. As with caveats, there is merit on both sides of the argument. NATO's standardization agreements establish guidelines for equipment and operations that keep allied forces interoperable: how fast networks need to transmit data, specifications for attaching bombs to aircraft wings, what kinds and how much ammunition units have, which signals ships at sea use over which frequencies, what kind of fuel vehicles run on. Most are mundane logistical details, but they are nonetheless essential to managing economies of effort. And because they are known and adhered to by all allies, they simplify any military operation, whether undertaken within NATO or not.

The problem comes when those standardization agreements hold states back from war-winning or life-saving innovations. Countries cannot be expected to forego advances in military technology or operations that would cause them fewer casualties or lower the likelihood of defeat. Yet if guidelines were not established and strictly adhered to, coalition forces would have to segregate their operations geographically, take widely varying levels of casualties, and assume very different levels of risk. Operations would require the greatest risk of the countries least able to bear them. The United States, as the NATO country with the biggest budget, greatest demands, and most widely varied security obligations, tends to be the fastest innovator. European nations often struggle to keep pace, feeling that they no sooner meet a standard than the U.S. military raises it. And the U.S. military complains that Europeans lag in adopting newer, better methods.

For example, the U.S. military developed a geolocator called the "blue force tracker" that could tag friendly vehicles so that everyone on the U.S. net could see associated forces. It dramatically reduced fratricide incidents, but the devices were new to U.S. forces and not yet adopted by allied arsenals at the time of the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. military couldn't be expected not to utilize them, but allies rightly understood that they reduced the risk only to U.S. forces. The solution in that instance was for the U.S. military to also tag allies, because the political and human costs of friendly fire incidents are so high. Many such solutions are relatively simple in the near term—loans—but harder in the medium term when allies choose not to adopt new practices or equipment.

There is no enduring solution to these problems: They are inherent in coalition fighting. One of the quietly whispered fears of Europeans over the past 25 years has been that, as America's wars have shifted from Europe to the Middle East, its military talent has migrated in that direction as well. And so, too, its attention: Several European diplomats mentioned during the Obama Administration that they were almost homesick for the arguments about the EU and defense policy with the Bush Administration, because at least Bush cared enough about the issues to fight over them. Europeans sense an ebbing tide of American expertise on European issues, noticing that the same expert's cycle through Europe. "They don't know us" is the subtext of European concern.

*Entre Chien et Loup*³

Russian aggression is reviving interest in European security, but not diminishing other claims on American attention. Part of the reason why Trump's criticism of European defense resonates is that challenges in Europe look manageable with the power Europeans could muster on their own. Could Britain, France, Poland, and Germany really not bring enough power to bear to defeat a Russian invasion of a Baltic state? If not, should they not quickly mobilize greater military forces—or more creatively use the nuclear and conventional forces they already have—instead of relying so heavily on American guarantees? Russia is not the peer of any of those countries (with the possible exception of Poland), much less all of them combined.

This plaint misses an important point. In aggregate, Europe's military assets look formidable, but only the United States can bring them together in an effective fighting ensemble. We are the mainframe, so to speak, and the allies plug into that—whether we are talking about intelligence, logistics, lift, or half a dozen other crucial functions in contemporary warfighting. However well equipped they look on paper, our allies strain to coordinate their assets without us.

In any event, Americans would be wise not to scorn Europeans for clinging to us when they're worried. Few states have the ability or domestic support to act without benefit of allies or international institutions. The United States does. But allied support matters for our domestic political purposes as well: Americans are more confident that our government is in the right when we win the support of other states that share our values. It matters especially now, when the international order is fraying. The world looks less safe, and the rules less respected, than they did a decade ago.

That countries invite us into their problems is one of the great assets of the American-led order. It reinforces our power to be the guarantor of the order, giving us greater influence over the rules that are set. American hegemony has been unique in setting rules that advantage others as well as us—a mutually beneficial outcome that makes sustaining that order less expensive overall. If we had to impose rules, rather than rely on the attractiveness of our policies, American power would be a much costlier proposition.

Our country has a wider margin of error than most—we can ignore problems that will more quickly overwhelm others. We could choose, as President Trump has often suggested, defining our interests narrowly and leaving other states to their fates. But the international order America constructed after World War II is manifestly in our interests. Transatlantic cooperation vividly demonstrates the difference between American power and that of its rivals, because it proves that our methods are different from governments that threaten Europe’s sovereignty and would impose different values.

Europe and the United States constitute a community based on values, not just a military alliance. Indeed, the military alliance would be impossible without shared values—the Eisenhower Administration envisioned NATO-like regional alliances around the world (the South East Asian Treaty Organization comprised of France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan; the Central Treaty Organization consisting of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); none but NATO proved sustainable. Americans are leery of committing themselves to states with which they share only interests.

America’s security and prosperity benefit from having allies that share our values and help us advance them throughout the world. Those tiresome allies are our primary advantage over rivals like China. While it was the work of a generation to pull Europe’s perspective beyond its borders, NATO has largely succeeded in that. As a former Norwegian Foreign Minister evangelized, “China is not just rising for the United States; it is rising for Europe, too.” Our NATO allies are important validators of the American-led order and important contributors to its sustainment. We will want their help as challenges grow in the Middle East, Russia corrodes further, and China rises (assuming it actually will). We should take care not to throw those allies overboard until we have better allies to replace them with, and that is highly unlikely to occur any time soon.

¹Carl Ek, “NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues” (Congressional Research Service, February 2012); Germany is the next-highest payer at

15 percent. See “Funding NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 19, 2017.

²Same beach, same sea (Italian).

³Between dog and wolf (French); descriptive of dusk, when the known world feels wild.

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Donald Trump is wrecking U.S. alliance with Europe

There will be real costs to America if the president sticks to this course, from trade and the Iran deal to fighting ISIS and containing Russia.

The 70th anniversary of the [Marshall Plan](#) this week should be a celebration of the trans-Atlantic alliance — the most powerful and successful in modern history. Secretary of State George [Marshall’s speech](#) at the Harvard commencement on June 5, 1947, set in motion the historic U.S. aid program to revive Europe’s shattered economies. It also set the stage for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Common Market and eventually the European Union.

The Need

Europe was devastated by years of conflict during World War II. Millions of people had been killed or wounded. Industrial and residential centers in England, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Belgium and elsewhere lay in ruins. Much of Europe was on the brink of famine as agricultural production had been disrupted by war. Transportation infrastructure was in shambles. The only major power in the world that was not significantly damaged was the United States.

HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

Aid to Europe

From 1945 through 1947, the United States was already assisting European economic recovery with direct financial aid. Military assistance to Greece and Turkey was being given. The newly formed United Nations was providing humanitarian assistance. In January 1947, U. S. President Harry Truman appointed George Marshall, the architect of victory during WWII, to be Secretary of State. Writing in his diary on January 8, 1947,

Truman said, “Marshall is the greatest man of World War II. He managed to get along with Roosevelt, the Congress, Churchill, the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he made a grand record in China. When I asked him to [be] my special envoy to China, he merely said, ‘Yes, Mr. President I’ll go.’ No argument only patriotic action. And if any man was entitled to balk and ask for a rest, he was. We’ll have a real State Department now.”

In just a few months, State Department leadership under Marshall with expertise provided by George Kennan, William Clayton and others crafted the Marshall Plan concept, which George Marshall shared with the world in a speech on June 5, 1947 at Harvard. Officially known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan was intended to rebuild the economies and spirits of western Europe, primarily. Marshall was convinced the key to restoration of political stability lay in the revitalization of national economies. Further he saw political stability in Western Europe as a key to blunting the advances of communism in that region.

The European Recovery Program

Sixteen nations, including Germany, became part of the program and shaped the assistance they required, state by state, with administrative and technical assistance provided through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the United States. European nations received nearly \$13 billion in aid, which initially resulted in shipments of food, staples, fuel and machinery from the United States and later resulted in investment in industrial capacity in Europe. Marshall Plan funding ended in 1951.

Results

Marshall Plan nations were assisted greatly in their economic recovery. From 1948 through 1952 European economies grew at an unprecedented rate. Trade relations led to the formation of the North Atlantic alliance. Economic prosperity led by coal and steel industries helped to shape what we know now as the European Union.

Chronology

- [Introduction and Chronology of the Marshall Plan](#) from June 5 to November 5, 1947 – Thorsten V. Kalijarvi. (U.S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service) November 6, 1947. Chronology with excellent coverage of the committees established by President Truman and House of Representatives to

analyze the initial report of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation and study the impact on the U.S. economy of aid to Western Europe.

Background

- [Marshall and the “Plan”](#) – by Larry I. Bland
- [How the Marshall Plan Came About](#) – Humanities, (November/December 1998, Volume 19/Number 6) with excerpts from important sources.
- [The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation](#) – Bulletin, (June 1982); Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs.
- [The Marshall Plan: A Strategy that Worked](#) – U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, (April 2006); United States Information Agency.
- [Origins of the Marshall Plan – Memorandum by Charles P. Kindleberger](#), Chief of the Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Committee Reports

- [European Recovery and American Aid](#) – The “Harriman Committee” report by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid. The committee “was asked to determine the limits within which the United States could safely and wisely extend aid to Western Europe.” Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee) stated that the Harriman Committee’s “ultimate report is one of the most comprehensive ever made to a public problem.”

It is, perhaps, the least expected opening to a German editorial at the moment: Donald Trump is right. But it's true. At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, Germany announced that it would soon dramatically increase its defense spending. When Trump and his Defense Secretary James Mattis now admonish Germany to fulfill its pledge, they are right on two counts. First, on principle: Promises should be kept. Second, on merit: There is no reason that, more than 70 years after World War II, the United States should continue carrying the main burden for ensuring European security.

Unfortunately, this isn't just a question of money. America's justified demand comes right in the middle of an internal [crisis in the West](#) so deep that nobody knows how much of the West will be left in the end. NATO always aspired to be something more than a

defense alliance. It viewed itself as the protective power of liberal democracy, the West and Western principles. It was a moral framework, the foundations for their existence. But are we certain that the West is still a community of shared values? If it's not, then what is NATO defending? Countries like Hungary and Poland, where right-wing populists are eroding the separation of powers, minority protections and freedom of the press? A Turkey that President Erdogan is currently in the process of transforming into a dictatorship? And are we really ready to stand at America's side if Trump goes to war against Iran, North Korea or some

DER SPIEGEL

Defense spending among NATO members

NATO is not obsolete, but its importance is dwindling. It has become hollow. One could view that as a delayed symptom of its own success. It helped bring democracy to Europe, it contained and integrated Germany and it drove the Soviet Union to collapse. Ultimately, it was inevitable it would eventually fall into crisis. A defense alliance whose opponents disappear will face an existential crisis sooner or later.

The alliance followed up its greatest success with a profound failure. NATO was unsuccessful in turning Russia into a partner. The fears harbored by the Baltic and Central European states are thus understandable. As are Russian suspicions of the alliance. Either way, an alliance whose sole justification is its opposition to Russia is out of date. America has long since viewed its most vital security interests to be in the Pacific region and the Middle East. And for Europe, North Africa and the Middle East are at least as important as Russia.

Europe Needs Stronger Defense

The era in European history when the Continent could delegate its security to a partner across the Atlantic has passed, irrevocably. That will remain true even after Trump is no longer in the White House. Trump, after all, is a symptom of the crisis in the West, not its cause. America remains a possible partner for Europe, but it is no longer a reliable one. Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference, rightly warned Europeans not to write America off as a partner. That would be premature. But it would also be reckless and naïve if Europe were not to prepare for the fact that it can no longer unconditionally rely on the United States

In the medium-term, Europe must be capable of sufficiently defending itself and providing for its own security. What is most needed in order to make that happen is unity. If Germany and other Europeans now spend more on defense, they will also have to increase their military cooperation as well as massively expand the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. Europe's alliance should not replace NATO, but it must enable Europeans to stand by each other if the Americans will no longer do it.

Europe is in crisis. Once more, America will have to step in to save us

In 1947 George Marshall, the US secretary of state, went to [Europe](#). He was shocked by what he saw: a continent in ruins, and rampant hunger. The mood in Paris, Berlin and other capitals was resigned and doom-laden. On returning to Washington, Marshall told President Truman that something dramatic needed to be done – and very soon. The initiative would have to come from Washington, he said.

We can't rely on America to pack up Europe's current troubles

Letters: Natalie Nougayrède is unlikely to have many American takers in a presidential election year in which the demand of the leading candidate in one party to ban Muslim migrants is, like it or not, popular

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On 5 June, in a speech to students at Harvard, Marshall announced his [European recovery programme](#). It became, in the words of the British politician Ernest Bevin, “a lifeline to sinking men”. The [Marshall plan](#) not only helped Europe back on its feet, it laid the groundwork for the cooperation that ultimately led to the creation of the [European Economic Community](#), the European Union's predecessor.

In [Davos](#) this week Joe Biden, the US vice-president, may well have had a shock similar to Marshall's. Of course today's gloom in Europe is not comparable to the devastation left by the second world war – but alarmist language is being heard all the same. Manuel Valls, the French prime minister, has spoken of a risk of European “dislocation”. “Europe has forgotten that history is fundamentally tragic,” [he said](#). Joachim Gauck, the German president, also used the word “tragic” when describing Europe's difficulties over the refugee crisis.

Europe today is in such a shambles that it is not absurd to ask whether the US should again do something about it, or whether the old continent even matters to American strategic interests any more. The answer to both questions should be a resounding “yes”.

It is obviously unrealistic to think the US is likely to repeat the kind of assistance it deployed in 1947. But the US urgently needs to seriously re-engage on European matters. Failing that, it risks seeing the European project unravel, with more disorder pouring into and across the continent and, ultimately, the loss of key allies.

Europe is currently struggling with the danger of [Brexit](#) and major security threats (which include terrorism, and Russian aggression), as well as the political fallout of the refugee crisis. It's not that US action in itself would miraculously solve all these problems, but its aloofness has arguably contributed to making them worse.

The decade where Europeans seemed more or less capable of taking care of themselves has drawn to a close

On three key European issues America needs to speak out more and act more – and soon. First, Barack Obama needs to make it plain that a British departure from the EU would not only risk breaking Europe altogether, but would spell the end of anything that still smacks of the “special relationship” between the US and Britain. Some American officials say it in private, but unfortunately not in public: Britain must remain a member of the EU if it is to retain any significant interest for the US, and the international stage at large.

Second, the US needs to show more commitment to Europe's security. Some things have been [done within Nato](#) since [Russia launched a military offensive](#) in Europe; but more US political leverage is needed if a common European defence policy is to become fact. It is not enough to state, as Washington often has, that Europeans need to “share the burden” of collective security.

Third, the US cannot continue to treat the refugee crisis destabilising Europe as if it were a far-flung problem that doesn't affect its direct interests. Around 4.5 million refugees have fled the Syrian civil war. [The US has taken just 2,600.](#)

There are many reasons why the Obama era has been perceived as one of American indifference to Europe – and not just the fact that a [bust of Churchill was taken out of the Oval Office](#) in 2009. US priorities have simply been placed elsewhere: Asia and the Pacific have loomed large on Obama's radar, not Europe and the Atlantic. But the decade

where Europeans seemed more or less capable of taking care of themselves has drawn to a close.

Any new Marshall plan will founder in the minds of Europe's hesitant leaders

Mark Mazower

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Now what we have are European solitudes: the solitude of inward-looking Britain, stuck in a renegotiation with Brussels that no one will be happy with; the solitude of economically weak France, struggling to build the kind of European anti-jihadi coalition it hoped for after the terror attacks of 2015; and the solitude of Germany, whose calls for solidarity in the face of mass migration have been mostly unanswered.

Of course, Europe's predicament must be blamed first and foremost on its own failings – not on the US. But by privileging bilateral relations in recent years, essentially picking and choosing individual European partners depending on the issue at hand, the US has been weak in what was its historical role: helping forge European unity. The Ukrainian crisis was mostly outsourced to Germany's Angela Merkel. And on anti-terrorism, France has become America's best European friend – arguably to the detriment of a wider, shared continental effort.

In the 90s the US had to move in to save Europe from catastrophe – wars in the Balkans [killed hundreds of thousands, and millions were displaced](#). Europeans had been divided (Germany favoured Croatia, while France sympathised with Serbia). Successive US administrations hesitated to get involved, with James Baker, the then secretary of state, famously saying: “We don't have a dog in this fight.” In the end Bill Clinton found himself having to act, not only to stop the carnage but to preserve the very ambition of a “Europe whole and free”.

Since 1947 the US goal has been a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe – not for altruistic reasons, but because such a continent serves American interests. Today's Europeans are faced with so many existential crises that they need the US at their side. If the Obama administration doesn't do it, the next one will have to.

When Marshall laid out the aim of his plan at Harvard, he said it would “restore the confidence of the European people in the future of their own countries and in Europe as a whole”. This spirit needs to be re-enacted.

[Natalie Nougayrède](#)

Europe without America: The Erosion of NATO

By [Earl C. Ravenal](#)

The end of Hitler's New Order in Europe in May 1945 ushered in a new order in America's relationship to Europe. The arrangements that were designed, debated and put in place during the following four years endure to this day. They are part of the world into which the present generation of foreign policy practitioners and commentators were professionally and intellectually born; and they shape the perceptions and limit the imagination of the general public. NATO, in particular, is a fixture in the international political and strategic firmament. The present Atlantic relationship is not without flaws, but since its framework has the aspect of a given, critiques fix on surface phenomena and proximate factors—apparent weaknesses or apparent strengths. Improvements are considered within the given framework, not as alternatives to it. Even the flaws are felt as mere irritants, inspiring only enraged political opposition or petulant geopolitical daydreams.

In the past few years, the tides of discontent have been lapping at the base of the Atlantic alliance. And there has formed a sort of unholy and unintended coalition of the European left (for example, the German Green Party and the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party, or the left wing of the British Labour Party) and the American right. The outbursts of one nourish the resentments of the other. Indeed, if NATO ever is washed away, the cause may be seen to be the feuding of these transatlantic factions.

But, after almost four decades, it is time to gain more perspective on the architecture of NATO and to do some wholesale reckoning of NATO's situation. For there is another, structural, reason for NATO's present debility, which is at the root of the attitudes of the factions of left and right on both sides of the Atlantic: the danger and yet the incredibility of the American military guarantee of Europe, including our "nuclear umbrella." The cracks in America's guarantee in turn proceed from a tension inherent in

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Why Europe needs America, a little

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As the U.S. presidential election campaign gears up and conflicts on the other side of the Atlantic multiply, two opposing views on what to do about European security compete for airspace in U.S. public debate. The first is essentially “[let’s get out of there](#)”—America no longer has any business being engaged in Europe’s security. The opposing view is that Europe will collapse, implode, or be invaded (whether by the Islamic State or migrants) [unless the United States steps in](#).

Both of these prescriptions are off base. They don’t even accurately describe the state of the current transatlantic division of labor.

LOVE ME AGAIN

In reality, the U.S. and European governments have not worked so closely together on key security issues, nor so successfully, in quite a while. Washington, Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and other European capitals hammered out a consensus on sanctions against Russia, and those sanctions remain in place. NATO is ramping up its capabilities, and several European governments (including Germany) are increasing their defense budgets. And achieving the Iran deal required considerable cooperation among American, British, French, German, and Russian negotiators. They managed to bridge very different interests and ended up playing as a tightly coordinated diplomatic tag team—a fact that did not fail to impress the government in Tehran.

In reality, the United States and European governments have not worked so closely together on key security issues, nor so successfully, in quite a while.

While the outcomes of these efforts have been imperfect, it’s safe to say that these concerted efforts at transatlantic diplomacy averted war. European governments—contrary to popular misconception, at least in the United States—often played leadership roles. Cooperation around Ukraine and Iran are excellent examples of what close transatlantic security cooperation can achieve. But they also show that it took the very real risk of a major conflagration—involving states with nuclear weapons, no less—to force the allies to focus and work together.

On the level of policy implementation and transactional diplomacy, the state of transatlantic cooperation is actually pretty good. It is mostly pragmatic, constructive, and based on a broad set of shared interests and values. In fact, the United States and the European Union have been developing a new appreciation for each other. Europeans have been watching with some admiration as President Obama ticks off his foreign policy legacy list (Iran: done; Cuba: done; Guantanamo: um, still working on it).

Ukraine's challenges for 2016

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Feelings in the United States about Europe are perhaps a bit more mixed; criticism of Europe's handling of the Greek crisis has been mostly scathing. But European governments' unexpected readiness to stand up to Russia has left a favorable impression in Washington. As for the Iran deal, it took the United States to get it clinched—but Europeans (and a German initiative) brought it to the table in the first place.

Absent imminent disaster, however, the transatlantic record of cooperation on security threats is a lot less impressive. We are flailing in the fight against ISIS, and seem powerless to stop the disastrous civil war in Syria or sectarian conflict in Iraq. We are rooted to the ground watching a multi-tentacled Chinese foreign policy that ranges from island-building in the South China Sea to laying transport lines across Eurasia to Hoovering up textile factories in Italy and the American South. A Russia crumbling under its own inability to modernize and adapt to globalization is a daunting prospect and one for which we appear unprepared.

Our track record in shoring up states against the risk of disintegration and helping them to transform (such as Tunisia and Ukraine) is dismal. As for the West's most noble achievement after World War II,—building and maintaining the norms and institutions that supported a liberal international order for seventy years—today we seem to be doing almost no building and little maintenance.

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[T]he European project itself is under threat.

While the United States has urgent concerns around the world, none of them currently threaten America's primacy in the international order, much less its existence. Europeans, in contrast, are facing the worst array of domestic and external security threats since the Cold War order collapsed a generation ago. The sovereign debt crisis (and the festering North-South divide it has produces), slow growth, high levels of youth unemployment, and badly managed immigration have combined to fuel anti-globalization, anti-EU, and anti-foreigner populist sentiment. Externally, Russia is stoking war in Ukraine and intimidating its neighbors, and the post-war regional order in North Africa and the Middle East is crumbling, producing a mass outpouring of refugees. To quote Sweden's former Prime Minister Carl Bildt, Europe appears to be surrounded by a ring of fire. And it's not just the neighborhood: the European project itself is under threat.

THE CASE FOR COOPERATION

Under the circumstances, it's hard to fault the Americans in the camp that wants to extricate itself from European problems. The United States has legitimate security concerns elsewhere on the globe; the largest but by no means the only one being the rise of China. Ordinary Americans are understandably tired of war, and wary of new entanglements.

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Still, there are potent reasons for America to stay engaged in and with Europe. Most of Europe's concerns are American concerns, too. Here are some examples:

- Shale gas exploitation has made the United States far less dependent on the Middle East's oil. But Israel's security remains a paramount interest, as does

containing Iran's hegemonic ambitions. America needs a stable Egypt and Saudi Arabia as allies. For all this, Europe's diplomatic heft, its trade power, and, yes, the weapons it supplies to allies, are key.

- Russia's cooperation remains important for dealing with Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, counterterrorism, and other issues. American "realists" like John Mearsheimer or Stephen Walt treat Ukraine as a second-order problem. But Moscow has violated principles—territorial sovereignty, the right to choose alliances—that go to the heart of what the West stands for. Sacrificing these on the altar of expediency is unlikely to gain President Putin's respect or make him a more amenable partner. Sanctions, on the other hand, have (together with falling oil prices and a declining Russian economy) sent an unambiguous message of condemnation and increased the cost of Russia's aggression. They would be meaningless without European support, which comes at a much higher price
- America's and Europe's economies have become deeply integrated through mutual trade and investment. Europe's inability to resolve its sovereign debt crisis would be highly damaging for American business interests and the U.S. economy. It would also undercut any effort by Europe to carry a greater share of the transatlantic security burden.
- Last but not least, Europe shares many American values and its fundamental preference for a liberal international order. Its support provides legitimacy and leverage to what otherwise would often be American unilateralism.

Most of Europe's concerns are American concerns, too.

America is strong enough, of course, to deal with Russia and the Middle East on its own. But that would be lonely, costly, and wearying. Sharing the burden is cheaper.

DON'T OVERSTEP

But the we-have-to-get-back-in-there faction hasn't got it right either—notwithstanding the clamoring in Eastern Europe for the United States to bring back Cold-War levels of troops and armaments to Europe. America should stick with Europe, but not stampede it.

- If war broke out in Europe, massive American help would be needed, and it's hard to imagine that the U.S. would not come. But—like a deliberate Article V-type attack against a NATO member state—it is the least likely thing to happen.

Fixating on this scenario prevents preparation and cooperation for much more likely risks, such as the accidental escalation of a minor conflict.

- Short of major war, we have to assume the United States will not bring tank divisions back to Europe. Europeans should not presume that the United States will continue to supply the backbone of Europe's defense in all contingencies.
- There can be no question that Europe's states need to improve their defense and deterrence—particularly if they can no longer free-ride on American capabilities. This requires, among other things, increased defense budgets and a renewed focus on hard power. Leaders in Washington should stop harping on the 2 percent (defense expenditures relative to gross domestic product) benchmark; simply spending more doesn't solve our problems.
- Instead, the United States should help Europe figure out how to develop its capabilities, use its budgets more intelligently, and create more common European assets and forces (rather than use bilateral relationships to foster divisions). It should also help Europe improve the software for its hard power: intelligence, analysis, foresight, doctrines, planning, and coordination. All this will allow Europe to deter threats and defend itself. It will also make it a better ally.

My teens spanned the 1970s, memorable for being a decade of economic recession, the emergence of neoliberal politics and economics, and the accelerating polarization of the world between the United States (and its NATO allies) and the Soviet Union. The decade ended with the election of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

During the early 1980s I became more politically aware. It seemed then that European politics was dominated by the apparently impregnable wall separating East from West and of the vast Soviet empire whose ranks were massed behind it. Our home in the UK received, as did many other homes of the era, a booklet outlining what to do in the event of a nuclear attack. The perception and presentation of this kind of cold war 'reality' was further fuelled for a young evangelical by the atheism and godlessness to which the Soviet socialist states pledged their unwavering allegiance.

Iron curtain drawn back

Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 and a succession of Western leaders engaged his attempts to decrease tensions with the West, accompanied

by the introduction of domestic political and economic liberalisation. As communist governments crumbled during 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990 became inevitable, along with the demise of cold-war political and geographical realities. The ‘iron curtain’ that had separated ‘Eastern’ Europe from the ‘West’ was finally drawn back.

I have now lived half of my lifetime in the wake of the political, economic, social, and religious changes that were ushered in by the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. A mere 15 years after the political changes, I moved with my wife to take up a mission position based in Hungary, a relocation that would have been inconceivable in 1989. We were there to take advantage of the central location of Budapest in the geography of the new Europe.

Other mission agencies with a similar pan-European focus to ours found that Budapest was a useful base from which to gain rapid access to most of Europe. Budapest, as a capital city that had been formerly described as ‘Eastern Europe’ (implying that it was on the edge of modern and progressive Europe) had now become a central European capital with easy access to all parts of it.

This article attempts to capture, albeit impressionistically, something of the most significant developments of the last quarter of a century in Europe. Having done that I will then try to outline and review some of the main implications that these changes continue to pose to evangelical mission agencies and their related church communities.

Nationhood, independence, and ethnicity

For much of the post-war period through until the late 1980s, Europe’s internal conflicts were generally framed in a way that opposed the ‘East’ with the ‘West’. Of course, this obscured tensions and conflict internal to each of these two European regions, tensions that would later emerge with lethal consequences in the countries of the Balkans.

When the overly simplistic East-West account of European identity collapsed, a vacuum emerged in which it was possible for powerful and lethal tribalism to emerge around the notions of newly emerging nations.¹ In most instances these contemporary forms of tribalism were built around identities that were taken to be ethnically homogenous and frequently shaped with reference to historical religious identities (Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim) that had been suppressed by communist regimes.

In its most extreme and violent expression, armed conflict ravaged former Yugoslavia for the eight years between 1991 and 1999, resulting in approximately 140,000 deaths and massive damage to the infrastructure and economy of the region. Competing nationalist aspirations and ethnic tensions fed these wars. Although armed hostilities in the Balkans finally ceased with the ending of the Kosovo War in 1999, regional tensions remain and continue to hamper the access and activities of mission agencies working in these regions.

Of course the aspiration to nationhood and self-determination is not always malignant and, in the case of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, saw a separation of the former Czechoslovakia during the ‘Velvet Revolution’ into its constituent territories. As the countries of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, for example, addressed their self-identification, they quickly embraced the language of ‘Central Europe’. This served two purposes. Firstly, it allowed these and other countries to jettison the old socialist-era language of ‘the East’. Secondly, it enabled them to forge a common sense of regional identity and shared purpose.

As the European Union extended its borders with the accession of new member states in 2004, 2007, and 2013, citizens of all 28 EU countries gained the freedom to live and work across the entire EU community. In each EU country, with this new freedom to migrate, populations are beginning to experience new forms of internal ethnic and national diversity. In some instances, this factor has fuelled ethnic and nationalist tensions. These, in turn, drive Euro-sceptical movements and political parties, lend support to forms of political extremism targeted at ethnic minorities, and entrench resistance to particular groups of immigrants.

National governments of the former ‘West’ are also sensitive to internal tensions that may be regional and historic. In the case of Scotland, the political machinery gathered sufficient momentum towards a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom in 2014 which ultimately proved unsuccessful. Moreover, similar aspirations continue to stir the desire for independence in Catalonia and other regions of Spain—moves consistently resisted by the Spanish central government.

New forms of political alliance

Of course, the European Union, with 28 member states, is not the only institution that represents the joint interests of European nations. The older Council of Europe (established in 1949) represents 47 member states, including the former Soviet states that

remain outside EU membership (with the notable exception of Belarus, the only outstanding dictatorship in Europe). However, as an effective instrument of joint policy-making, the EU is by far the more effective of the two bodies.

With the expansion of the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013, the EU has grown from a membership of 15 to 28 countries. Eleven of these new EU member states were located within the Soviet bloc prior to 1989. The six-month presidency of the European Union has been held by each of the countries of the former Soviet bloc which are now members of the EU.

A further four countries are either formal candidates for the EU or have potential candidate status (Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo) and two (Montenegro and Serbia) are negotiating a roadmap towards accession.

The demise of the former Soviet Union paved the way for the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS promotes the common interests of its members and, to an extent, one of its outcomes ensures the maintenance of closer ties among ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking passport holders in what Russia frequently refers to as its 'near abroad':

- The presence of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Georgia lent justification to Moscow's claims of protecting Russians living in Ukrainian territory in Crimea and its control of former Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
- Moldova is also vulnerable in this regard, having its own ethnic Russian population in the Transnistria region, east of the Dniester River and bordering Ukraine.
- While the three Baltic States also have ethnic Russian populations, they are afforded the relative protection of NATO membership. However, instances of air-space intrusions by Russian forces intensified throughout 2015 in developments that some interpret as Soviet-style provocations along borders that were formerly located wholly or partially within the Soviet Union.

Increasing cultural and religious diversity

For citizens of a majority of EU states, the *Schengen Agreement* has guaranteed the freedom of unrestricted passage across national borders that are internal to the *Schengen Zone*. EU citizens have the right to reside, work, and conduct business in any one of the

EU's member states. This has contributed to healthy patterns of cultural and religious diversity.

As the scale of non-EU migration into Europe accelerated across 2014-2015, several member states enacted unilateral measures intended to control the entry of migrants into their territory, including the erection of border fences. This has contributed to the pressure for Brussels-based European politicians to enact Article 26 of the *Schengen Agreement* which allowed for the temporary re-introduction of border checks if there were 'persistent serious deficiencies' at the external border. In late 2015 it was decided to allow the re-introduction of temporary border checks for a period of up to two years. This will also mean stricter external border controls.

The presence of immigrants in Europe has accelerated its cultural and religious diversity and prompted new policy and political responses. During the mid-years of the 'noughties' European politicians began to announce the demise of multiculturalism. Accompanying this was a new focus on 'interculturalism' that promoted a more intentional approach to the integration of migrants through policies supporting language acquisition, entry into education and the workforce, and the promotion of national or European values (assessed formally in some countries).²

With cultural diversity came religious diversity and an increasing European sensitivity towards Islam, particularly in the form of the more radical Muslim groups. The secular 1970s did not prepare Europe well for the religious vitality that would become all too apparent during the late 1990s and onwards.

Religious conviction was implicit in the various Balkans conflicts with, for example, Serbian Orthodox fighting against Bosnian Muslims and Croatian Catholics. The use of religious labels is unconvincing to most theologians or religious teachers. However, their adoption by various movements has been remarkable in creating and sustaining committed identity and purpose, especially where these are directed towards the pursuit of violence.

Church and mission in Europe

Over the last 25 years, there seems to have been a sober re-assessment of the evangelical euphoria that was apparent during the early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe. Cynics at the time suggested that the call to conversion in the 1990s seemed to be 'Repent, believe, be baptised, and take a truckload of Bibles and children's clothes to an orphanage in Romania!'

Despite such objections, these early years saw an unprecedented openness to the Gospel, new religious freedoms, and a plethora of church planting ministries, Bible and literature distribution, social ministries, and evangelistic initiatives. This was bolstered by the arrival of large numbers of missionaries from the USA, Korea, and various western European mission agencies. Effective partnerships led to the establishing of many more local evangelical congregations in parts of Europe.

However, the presence of missionaries was not without its tensions. Their presence was resented almost unanimously by the traditional churches (Orthodox and Catholic) and not infrequently by existing evangelical churches which experienced the loss of formerly active members to non-indigenous churches that were well funded and resourced from the West.

The missionary activity of recent years has become more sensitive to the local context. Church planting from the West has lost the appeal of its novelty. Sustained and longer-term approaches are seen to be more appropriate. There are also, for example, innovative examples of evangelical co-operation with traditional churches, notably from among mission societies such as the British CMS or the German EMW and agencies such as World Vision.

In taking seriously their missionary commitment to Europe, there are also Christian churches and individuals who understand the need to engage their Christian worldview with the largely secular corridors of political, economic, cultural, social, and educational power.³ The European Union and its Commission are now required to serve and reflect the interests of 28 countries. Many of these are much more ‘non-secular’ than the pre-2004 ‘club of 15’. Engaging with European institutions will remain problematic for evangelicals and other people of faith but it does at least open up the possibility of another way of re-introducing the people of Europe to a convincing and compelling account of the Christian faith and the witness it gives to the Gospel of Jesus.

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